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A B S T R A C T
This study explored sport governance practice from the lived experience of one informant
spanning a 30-year period in the governance of two sport organisations (basketball and
cricket). Hermeneutic phenomenology, the methodological framework used for this study,
seeks to grasp the everyday world, and draw insight and meaning from it. The method
involves a series of in-depth interviews with one research participant, supplemented by
document analysis. Interviews were analysed using an interpretative process which
blended the world views of both the participant and researchers. The participant lived
through an era of increasing professionalisation within sport. His narrative, which tapped
into his governance expertise at state, national and international levels, provides insights
into the transition from an amateur to a commercial culture, referred to in this paper as
‘two worlds colliding’. From this narrative, three related themes were identiﬁed and
labelled, ‘volunteer and cultural encounters’; ‘structural encounters’; and ‘adversarial
encounters’. In drawing on hermeneutic philosophy, and highlighting that which has been
hidden from view, direction for future research and practice within the sport governance
domain is offered. These directions invite scholars to think about future sport governance
research as it relates to federated structures and how collaborative governance theory can
sharpen the focus in this domain.
 2012 Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand. Published by
Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
To govern is to steer an organisation, and to make decisions that are consequential, strategic, and impactful, usually on
behalf of others. In sport, scholars and practitioners have not yet fully grasped the signiﬁcance of the governing role. With a
growing, but still limited focus on the topic, research and theoretical attention to date have not yet resorted to fully
deciphering the complexities of governance within sport organisations (Hoye & Doherty, 2011). As an emerging ﬁeld of
inquiry, research in this domain has appropriately drawn on more mature bodies of knowledge from within the commercial,
public and non-proﬁt governance domain to position and advance theoretical notions of sport governance (Ferkins &
Shilbury, 2010). Agency, stewardship, institutional, resource dependence, stakeholder, and managerial hegemony theory are
some of the major constructs that have been employed by scholars seeking to investigate the governance of sport (Hoye &
Cuskelly, 2007; Soares, Correia, & Rosado, 2010).
In encompassing governance within the commercial, public and non-proﬁt sectors, across which the legal entities of sport
transgress, Rhodes (1996) and Rosenau (1995) noted that governance is the process in which an organisation, network of
organisations, or a society steers itself, allocates resources, and exercises control and co-ordination. This description signals a* Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 392446164.
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governance) and governance between organisations (i.e., systemic governance, also referred to as network or federated
governance). To date, scholarly attention in relation to the governance of sport has tended to concentrate on organisational
governance and, more speciﬁcally, governance of non-proﬁt sport organisations (Hoye & Doherty, 2011).
In research on sport governance to date, scholars have sought to establish the role of the board in sport organisations
(Inglis, 1997; Shilbury, 2001; Yeh & Taylor, 2008; Yeh, Taylor, & Hoye, 2009); volunteer motivations for serving in the
governing role (Cuskelly & Boag, 2001; Inglis, 1994); executive committee cohesion and decision-making (Doherty & Carron,
2003; Soares et al., 2010); board performance and structure (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2003a; Hoye & Doherty, 2011; Kikulis, 2000;
Papadimitriou, 1999; Shilbury, 2001; Taylor & O’Sullivan, 2009); the shared leadership dynamic between the board and CEO
(Auld & Godbey, 1998; De Barros, Barros, & Correia, 2007; Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 2009; Hoye, 2004, 2006; Hoye &
Cuskelly, 2003b; Inglis, 1997; Schulz & Auld, 2006); and board strategic capability (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Ferkins,
Shilbury, & McDonald, 2005; Ferkins et al., 2009; Shilbury & Ferkins, 2011). These empirically derived themes evident within
the literature have tended to emerge from countries such as Canada, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Taiwan, UK, Australia, and New
Zealand where the sporting system is dominated by non-proﬁt sport organisations.
A common ingredient of a sport system dominated by non-proﬁt sport organisations is the systemic or federated nature
of the governance structures. Using the description noted above (Rosenau, 1995), systemic governance structures might,
therefore, be deﬁned as a network of organisations which seek to allocate resources, and exercise control and co-ordination.
Cricket Australia (the peak governing body for cricket in Australia), for example, governs not only within a network of state
and regional associations, but also local level clubs. Each entity within the network is a legally autonomous body, but, as
noted above by Rosenau, there exists interplay between Cricket Australia and state associations in relation to resource
allocation and the control of those resources. As also noted above, while studies in sport have focussed on organisational
governance, there is an acknowledgement that the federated nature of many national sport systems signiﬁcantly impacts on
the governing role, at whatever level the organisation exists within the system (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Hoye & Cuskelly,
2007; Soares et al., 2010; Taylor & O’Sullivan, 2009).
A second component of the federated sport system that has an important bearing on the governing role has been the
delegate representative model of board composition (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). Historically, the boards of sport governing
bodies have comprised member representatives whose role has been to represent the interests of their ‘home’ entity. Again,
using Cricket Australia as an example, its board has historically comprised state representatives who have been elected by
members of their respective state body (i.e., state cricket associations). Governing within a federated network of
organisations and the composition of the board, as a consequence of the federated system, are considered within this study
to be aspects of ‘systemic governance’ (Henry & Lee, 2004).
As Ferkins and Shilbury (2010) stated, in essence, sport governance ‘‘is the responsibility for the functioning and overall
direction of the organisation and is a necessary and institutionalised component of all sport codes from club level to national
bodies, government agencies, sport service organisations and professional teams around the world’’ (p. 235). None of these
sport organisations, however, can act independently of other agencies in the sporting system. To date, there have been few
studies in sport governance that have explored to any depth the impact of federated governance structures on the governing
role.
The purpose of this present study was to explore governance practice from the lived experience of one informant,
Malcolm Speed. Speed’s expertise spanned 30 years of involvement in the governance of sport at state, national and
international levels in federated structures. A lawyer by profession, Speed witnessed ﬁrst-hand (and contributed to) the
professionalisation of sport which commenced in the 1980s. Speed’s experiences include roles as a volunteer board member
with the Victorian Amateur Basketball Federation and the Australian Basketball Federation (later known as Basketball
Australia), paid roles as Chairman of the National Basketball League, CEO of the Australian Cricket Board (now known as
Cricket Australia) and the International Cricket Council. In exploring the lived experiences of Speed in the sport governance
domain, systemic and collaborative governance structures emerged as a key inﬂuence on the governing role. Implications of
systemic governance structures are, therefore, examined in order to develop a deeper understanding of sport governance
practice.
The methodological framework used for this study is hermeneutic phenomenology. Situated within the interpretative
paradigm, this approach seeks to grasp the everyday world, and draw insight and meaning from it. Despite the potential
insights of hermeneutics, this approach is rare in sport management research (Edwards & Skinner, 2009). The method
involved a series of in-depth interviews with one research participant, supplemented by Speed’s book entitled Sticky Wicket
released in 2011. Interviews were analysed using an interpretative process which blended the world views of both the
participant and researchers. It is through this process that insights for sport governance, in relation to the impact of the
federated sport system, are offered.
This paper ﬁrst establishes the scholarly location of the research in brieﬂy reviewing governance and, speciﬁcally, sport
governance literature that relates to the outcomes of this study. Consistent with hermeneutic phenomenology, the
background to the problem is established rather than constructing a theoretical framework. Typically, in hermeneutics,
theoretical issues will follow the story (Smythe & Norton, 2011). This paper, in essence, is a story about the lived experiences
of one individual.
Following an explanation of the research approach, the story begins by presenting the main ﬁndings through three inter-
related themes. The three themes include ‘volunteer and cultural encounters’; ‘structural encounters’; and ‘adversarial
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interconnected demonstrating interplay between encounters. As indicated, these were not the only ﬁndings to emerge from
the data, and the emphasis, particularly on the adversarial theme, needs to be countered with the understanding that a
broader context existed within boardroom debate, as recounted by Speed, which we are unable to report on within the
conﬁnes of one paper. Other ﬁndings subject to future analysis included board involvement in strategy, CEO–Chair
relationships, shared leadership, governing structures, board composition, board member coalitions, power and inﬂuence,
and cultural diversity. Based on the ﬁndings articulated through each of the three themes, the discussion then maps out
future research directions via a series of questions designed to draw other scholars into thinking about future research in
sport governance.
2. Locating the study: scholarly conversations in sport governance
Agency theory has played a dominant role in the ‘scholarly conversation’ about governance over the course of the past 30
years. The ideas embedded within this theory posit that the purpose of the governing board is to monitor and control the
actions of the CEO (Davis & Schoorman, 1997). Agency theory assumes that the owners of an organisation will have divergent
interests from those who manage it (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Stewardship theory contrasts agency theory by encouraging
broader responsibility on behalf of the board to act as guardians of the organisation and its future (Davis & Schoorman, 1997).
It is a more collaborative or partnership-oriented approach to thinking about governance, considered useful within the non-
proﬁt and sport context (Cornforth, 2003; Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010). While these two theories certainly consider the broader
purpose of a board, they also focus on the CEO–board dynamic. As a consequence, agency and stewardship theory have
primarily been employed for the purposes of advancing understanding of organisational governance as distinct from
systemic governance.
In a search for theoretical perspectives that shed light on the federated nature of sport governance, constructs such as
institutional theory (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007), resource dependence theory (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978), stakeholder theory (Hung, 1998; Oliver, 1990), inter-organisational relationships (Dickson, Arnold, & Chalip, 2005),
and network theory (Henry & Lee, 2004; Kooiman, 1993) have begun to emerge within the scholarly conversation about
sport governance. Network theory and the construct of inter-organisational relationships were considered particularly
insightful for the present study. ‘‘Network theory addresses the interactions between a group of collaborating organizations
who recognize that their purposes cannot be achieved independently’’ (Babiak, 2007, p. 369).
Babiak, who studied the determinants of inter-organisational relationships within Canadian non-proﬁt sport
organisations, also asserted that a network is a means of collaboration that draws together the full array of stakeholders
involved with a particular sport organisation. Network theory was also used by Henry and Lee (2004) to explain the
complicated web of inter-relationships between stakeholders of commercial sport organisations (e.g., football) in the UK.
Considered in this way, sport governance is, therefore, a system that does not rely on a speciﬁc organisation, but on the
associations or inter-organisational relationships between organisations responsible for the shared governance of a sport.
Collaborative governance theory has gained some prominence within the public and government sector and the body of
research which focuses on public administration (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012). Within this setting, it is recognised
that a network of organisations (such as central and local government, charities, non-government organisations/non-proﬁt
organisations) are required to co-operate to achieve outcomes for a deﬁned community. According to Ansell and Gash
(2008), collaborative governance is a governing arrangement between organisations where agencies engage in a
‘‘. . .collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-orientated, and deliberative and that aims to make or
implement public policy or manage public programs or assets’’ (p. 544). As noted above, this inter-relationship between
organisations for the purposes of governance is also found to be prevalent within the sport setting, yet the construct of
collaborative governance theory has not yet entered the sport governance scholarly conversation. This study drew on the
ideas embedded within collaborative governance theory to analyse the insights derived from the lived experience of the
research participant, and as a lens through which to consider the vexed issue of systemic sport governance structures.
Finally, a common criticism of empirical work in governance is the lack of an insider’s view of what boards actually do
(Cornforth, 2003; Huse, 2009; Leblanc, 2004; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004; Parker, 2007). In this, our understanding is limited by a
research approach that does not engage enough with those whose life-world involves the governance of organisations, and
indeed governance between organisations. The predominant approach has involved a quantitative, outsider’s view of the
governing function (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Cornforth (2003), in arguing the limitations of such an
approach, considered that ﬁndings have oversimpliﬁed the problems of governance, and underestimated the ‘‘. . .conﬂicting
demands and pressures that board members face. . .’’ (p. 1). A further criticism is the narrow use of theory and, in particular,
the reliance on agency theory, with scholars of governance across settings encouraging greater use of a multi-theoretical
approach (Cornforth, 2003; Hoye & Doherty, 2011; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005).
In employing hermeneutic phenomenology, the present study sought to gain an in-depth, insider’s, and ‘life-world’
perspective of the practice of sport governance. This approach also drew on multiple theoretical perspectives, which were
used as ‘tools of interpretation’ as well as aiding the design of interview questions. To begin, agency and stewardship theory
were at the forefront of the interviewers’ minds, but, as the stories emerged, a broader range of theory (especially
collaborative governance theory), considered by the researchers to shed light on systemic governance, was drawn upon. The
following interview topics were also pre-established: national and international governance structures, inter-organisational
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involvement in strategy, professionalisation, power and politics. The interview process was informed by these theoretical
concepts derived from the literature (considered pre-understandings, rather than a theoretical framework) and, in turn, the
data interpretation process sought to inform current understanding of these concepts and theories. The next section sets out
in more detail, how data were collected and analysed.
3. Method
Hermeneutics is about life experience and seeks to grasp the everyday, ‘‘inter-subjective world of the respondents and
how that life-world is constituted’’ (Schmidt & Little, 2007, p. 227). In essence, it is an inductive and descriptive research
approach that seeks to study phenomena as they are consciously experienced (Beck, 1994). Maslow (1966) described
phenomenology as the use of subjective and ﬁrst-person experience as a source of knowledge. The approach is advocated by
interpretative social science researchers because it honours human experience (Smith, 1998).
In this study, the lived experience of one informant coincides with the transition from an amateur to a commercial culture
in the governance of sport in Australia and internationally. This experience, spanning nearly 30 years between 1980 and
2008, represents a unique opportunity to explore governance practice in a way that has not previously been undertaken.
Conrad (1990) stated that ‘‘While an N of 1 raises obvious problems of generalisability and potential idiosyncrasy, this
strategy may be quite appropriate for some ﬁne-textured case analysis’’ (p. 1258). The hermeneutic intent of this paper is not
to identify generalisable truths but rather to draw on the participant’s reﬂections as a spring board to ‘thinking’ (Smythe,
Ironside, Sims, Swenson, & Spence, 2008). One person whose involvement has spannned time and different sports brings the
advantage of being able to appreciate the shapers of change and difference.
When one accumulates experiences one learns what works and what does not and takes those insights forward; one sees
the advantage of progress and at the same time recognises strengths that have been lost. In other words, one has one’s own
comparative basis, or as Gadamer (1982) would say, ‘historical horizon’ on which to make judgements and interpretations.
The notion of the hermeneutic circle (Gadamer, 1982) is that understanding is always in tension between parts and the
whole. One participant brings a collection of parts from the whole of his considerable governance experience. The insights
from such research has become but one part to connect to a much larger whole of sport governance experience, literature and
research. The themes that have arisen represent foci that became apparent across the sixty-two pages of data and 30 years of
experience elicited from the interviews. Their purpose is not to bring an assumption that all sport governance is ‘the same’
but rather to invite those involved in similar work to re-think their own experiences, to ponder anew meanings, tensions and
complexity (Van Manen, 1990).
The philosophy of hermeneutics also recognises that ‘‘. . .one can only understand the experience of others through the
lens of one’s own historical being in the world’’ (Smythe, 2007, p. 20). Thus, researchers engaged an interpretative lens to
present interview ﬁndings in relation to current theory, mindful that their own experiences inﬂuence understanding. This
thinking, in turn, is inﬂuenced by key theoretical concepts derived from the literature in relation to sport governance.
Gadamer (2004) urged that pre-understandings are the very conditions by which we understand. ‘‘The challenge is not to set
them aside but rather to work with them in the quest towards understanding’’ (Smythe, 2007, p. 20). The researchers’
understanding of sport governance arises from their own educational and research journey in sport management, and as
members of sport boards. From this, the researchers drew on major governance concepts that, for them, informed the
theoretical foundations of sport governance practice.
3.1. Research participant
Our single research participant, Malcolm Speed, granted ethics permission to use his name in our written and oral work.
As noted earlier, Speed’s experience of sport governance spans three decades and encompasses the experience of governance
from a number of perspectives. These perspectives include roles as a board member, chairperson, and CEO of sport
organisations at a state (regional), national and international level. This paper draws on his experiences as a board member in
the 1970s and later as President of the Victorian Amateur Basketball Association (VABA) from 1980 to 1990; chairperson of
the National Basketball League (NBL) from 1987 to 1997; chairperson of the Australian Basketball Federation from 1993 to
1997; CEO of the Australian Cricket Board (ACB) from 1997 to 2001; and, ﬁnally, CEO of the International Cricket Council
(ICC) from 2001 to 2008.
Malcolm Speed was chosen because of his experience of the governance of sport at multiple levels, and for his
perspectives across an extended period of time. We also knew of his ability to recount his experience in an insightful yet non-
controversial way, and of his ability to reﬂect and make sense of his experience. In selecting participants for a
phenomenological study, the key criterion is that they have experienced the particular phenomenon being studied (Creswell,
1998). The ability to recount and reﬂect in the way Speed was able to do, was an added bonus for the researchers.
3.2. The interviews
The methods used to collect data were a series of three, 2-h, in-depth interviews with the one research participant. All
three interviews were conducted by the same two researchers’ and took place over a period of three months, allowing time
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interviewer and was helpful in identifying emerging themes as well as preparing for the forthcoming interview. It also
allowed for the opportunity to commence each subsequent interview with reﬂections on the interview recently completed.
Interviews were organised chronologically or, in other words, in the order of sport involvement by Speed. Speed’s encounters
in basketball were the focus of interview one, followed by his time at the ACB (interview two) and the third interview focused
on his experiences at the ICC. Consequently, the sport-by-sport experiences described were discrete, but the emerging
themes traversed all phases of his sport governance experiences.
Document analysis, including the use of the participant’s recently released book Sticky Wicket (2011) as a secondary
resource, was also used to support the interviews. At the time of the interviews, Speed was in the process of writing this book.
Consequently, he had been researching and reﬂecting on his experiences prior to and during this research process. The clarity
of his recall during the interviews was obviously assisted by the process associated with writing Sticky Wicket.
Phenomenological interviewing encourages open dialogue and a questioning process which maintains a focus on the
experience (Smith, 1998). The participant was, therefore, interviewed in a conversational manner (Smythe & Norton, 2007)
with questions commencing with a focus on Speed’s early board experiences. As he began recounting his experiences,
prompts around the interview topics noted earlier were provided by the researchers.
Each interview was recorded and transcribed for the purposes of analysis by the researchers. In total, there were 62 pages
of text (single spaced, 10 point). Due to the nature of the interview process, the transcripts fell into chronological order
beginning with the participant’s earliest experiences in the 1970s. Hermeneutics is often described as a systematic approach
to interpreting a text (Benner, 1985; Smith, 1998; Vickers & Parris, 2006), whereby the whole text is analysed ﬁrst, then parts
of the text, then returns to the whole. Benner (1985) explained that ‘‘comparing the two interpretations for conﬂicts and for
understanding the whole in relation to the parts and vice versa’’ (p. 9) is how the participant, the researcher, and even the
readers come to an understanding of the experience.
Also involved in this analysis of text was the act of writing. Van Manen (1990) explained the nature of interpretation as a
process of writing and rewriting, whereby ‘research is the work of writing’. Data were dealt with in this way by two
researchers, ﬁrst reading the transcripts, considering the experience in totality as well as seeking individual themes and
stories that would support the themes, and relating them back to the experience as a whole. Constant comparison of
individual themes and supporting stories was undertaken by the two researchers. We also consciously allowed for insights to
emerge that we may not have previously considered (Benner, 1985). In staying oriented to the aim of this study, we were
seeking stories that had ‘something to say’ about the nature of sport governance practice. The next section presents our
interpretation of what emerged, structured into themes, and supported by stories crafted from Speed’s experience.
4. Findings
The ﬁndings are organised around three related themes that emerged from data analysis. The ﬁrst two themes presented
include: volunteer and cultural encounters, and structural encounters. Both of these themes contain ﬁndings commonly
referred to in the literature when examining the implications of structure, and the barriers to governance and decision-
making within national, state or provincial sport organisations (Amis & Slack, 1996; Auld, 1997; Hoye, 2007; Inglis, 1997).
Most of this research in relation to state, national or provincial sport organisations has been driven by the commercialisation
of sport, including the role of government funding and increased accountability in return for this support (Enjolras, 2002;
Slack, 1985; Slack & Hinings, 1992). The pressure of increasing commercialisation and accountability reveals the tensions
evident in two different worlds and cultures as they collide during sport’s transition from volunteer-delivered amateur sport
to professionally managed and delivered sport supported by volunteers.
The third theme identiﬁed was labelled adversarial encounters and it presents a number of new encounters with
implications for sport governance. The use of the word ‘encounters’ attached to each theme arose naturally as a reﬂection of
the tensions evident in the collisions between these two worlds and cultures during the transition period. It also captured the
clarity with which Speed was able to detail speciﬁc encounters as examples of sport governance during his 30-year
involvement in both basketball and cricket.
4.1. Volunteer and cultural encounters
Volunteer and cultural encounters describe Speed’s experiences as he moved into a sport system that was predominantly
based on volunteer labour and an amateur culture, and how the transition from this system impacted the governance of
sport. Speed’s transition from player to administrator occurred through the sport of basketball where, in his mid 20s, he
found himself volunteering to attend a Victorian Amateur Basketball Association (VABA) meeting. As Speed noted:I’d just ﬁnished playing for Melbourne and went to coach Melbourne University. At one stage or another someone said:
Does someone want to go to the VABA meetings? I said, ‘I’ll go’. I was a young lawyer. I was interested in that sort of
thing and meetings were very informal. (22 March, 2010)With this informal, but typical entry to sport governance in the 1970s, Speed entered a domain that was largely
unstructured, often dominated by one or two strong personalities, and was not always concerned about longer-term
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are captured in the following extract.If I go back to those early committee meetings that I went to, it was very much in the style of the old committee. The
secretary was a man called Ken who had been coach of the Australian Olympic team in 1956 and 1968. He’d been my
coach. He ran it. The president was a man called Jack. It was an amazing organisation actually. When I became
president in 1980, I was 31 years of age. I was the fourth president in 50 years. The ﬁrst president had been the
president for 18 years, I think, and then the next one for, he might have only done 12, and then the next one had done
20. I was the shortest serving president at that stage. I only did ten years and there have been a few since. So Jack was
the president. He was very low-key. Ken ran it. (22 March, 2010)Speed was immersed in his sport because he loved his sport, so ‘fun’ was an important motivation. As Speed noted:There wasn’t any sophistication or subtlety to the meetings in those days. It was good fun and I look back on those
early basketball years, they were the years when we actually started to build basketball stadiums in Melbourne, the
stadiums that are all around the place, that are full. (22 March, 2010)Part of the fun was crafting direction from an unstructured context, and the challenge for Speed was in bringing structure
to this unstructured setting. The reference to building stadia was a metaphor for Speed’s own personal experiences and
credentials in a ﬁeld in which he was clearly motivated. Forging direction in response to building sustainable commercial
models was a consistent approach across the two sports and various organisations for which he worked, either as a volunteer
or paid professional. To achieve this goal meant working within systems largely reliant on volunteers, or adeptly working
with volunteer board members who did not necessarily share his aspirations and vision for future sports systems and
operations.
An agenda of cultural change was evident early. As a 30-year-old working in a committee environment largely
created for retired men, there was early recognition by Speed of the need for sustainable business models, and a
willingness to test tradition. The actions of challenging the incumbent to be elected as President of the VABA and,
subsequently, the Australian Basketball Federation, and executive chairman of the National Basketball League, were all
portents of preparation for a career in sport management. Culturally, there was no more signiﬁcant act than one of the
ﬁrst things he did, on his election as President of the VABA, which was to do away with the word ‘amateur’ from the title
of the Association.
After nearly two decades of involvement with basketball at all levels, Speed was offered the job as CEO of the ACB. His
experience in sport to that point had largely been as a volunteer committee member, chair of the VABA, the Australian
Basketball Federation, and executive chairman of the NBL. He had not previously held a paid appointment as an employee
in a sporting organisation. His appointment to the ACB in 1997 was his ﬁrst as a CEO and, signiﬁcantly, the ﬁrst in which
he was responsible to a board rather than presiding over the board. Although cricket was already functioning with paid
staff, and revenues were growing through television rights, sponsorship and ticket sales, the governance of the ACB was
still founded on a delegate model where representatives of the states formed the board, based on a formula which gave
more voting power to the three foundation member states of the 1905 Australian Board of Control (Vamplew, Moore,
O’Hara, Cashman, & Jobling, 1992). Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia were the three foundation members
and each was vested three delegates, whereas Western Australia and Queensland were represented by two delegates,
and Tasmania one.
Change was a consistent theme in cricket in 1997, and Speed joined the ACB following a falling-out between the previous
CEO and the board, in itself a governance issue of signiﬁcance. His insights now, from the perspective of the ofﬁce of the CEO,
capture the cultural contradictions inherent in a traditional delegate form of board:Some of the old timers on that board thought in the past the treasurer had dealt directly with the senior accountant.
One of the directors would often ring the marketing manager and give him direction whether he liked it or not. So it
was a very hands-on board and there was a commitment at that early stage to have the board operating more on
strategic issues. Bear in mind, most of these directors, they were all male, were generally elderly, they lived and
breathed cricket through their state associations and their clubs for many, many years. But there’s a system that
promoted longevity but to get there you had to be generally a cricketer who became a club administrator, who became
a state administrator, you waited for someone to die and then you got onto the Australian Cricket Board and, generally,
they tried to stay there as long as they could – many of them succeeded. There was no limit to their term. So it was a
fairly crusty, elderly, experienced, parochial board with a couple of exceptions. (11 May, 2010)An important characteristic of sport governance is the sport itself and the social facilitation created by the event for
players, spectators and administrators. Traditionally, a Test Match between Australia and England is a major sporting and
social event for many people. For ACB Board directors, and to a lesser extent ACB staff, this was no exception. From a
governance perspective, the social facilitation afforded by the event had the potential to blur the boundaries between
rational decision-making and the emotion of on-ﬁeld outcomes, yet it also had the potential to lubricate relationships
between volunteer board members and senior staff. One of Speed’s most important tasks was to build rapport with the
board, particularly given the need to convert the board from being hands-on and operationally focussed to a more
strategically oriented board.
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board members.The way that worked with cricket is well suited to that, in that if there was a cricket match, a Test Match in Brisbane, I’d
go to the Test Match in Brisbane, the two directors from Queensland would be there. If I stayed at the Test Match for
three days, I would have dinner with those two directors, their wives, or I would go to their home for dinner, the other
one would come. Sometimes they would bring members of their state association along so it was very collegial. In
Perth it became, and probably still is, a sort of annual event that the chairman and the chief executive go to Western
Australia for the Test Match and they go to a particular director’s home, whoever else was involved in Western
Australian cricket at that time comes to dinner that night, have a few drinks and get to know them. And you also spend
a lot of time at the cricket with these people, so you’re usually sitting with them at their table, so there were plenty of
opportunities there and generally that worked well. (11 May, 2010)This leisure-oriented culture explains the tensions associated with a focus on commercial and strategic imperatives.
Such tensions tested Speed’s main goal at the ACB which was to build a sustainable commercial model, while at the same
time grappling with a governance model not well-suited to that task. His appointment as CEO to the International Cricket
Council (ICC) in July 2001 brought more diversity to the concept of culture, as Speed was not only required to deal with the
traditional structural issues associated with the governance of the ICC, but also had to manage diversity ‘‘in terms of cricket
experience, business experience, different cultures, languages, religions, understanding of corporate governance. . .’’ (16
August, 2010).
Speed’s arrival at the ICC coincided with a recently reached broadcast rights agreement with a subsidiary of News
Corporation which would deliver $US550 million over seven years. As Speed noted, one of the things he was asked to do on
arrival at the ICC ‘‘was to turn it from being an under-resourced, poorly-regarded organisation into a properly-resourced,
well-regarded organisation. I was told there was a commitment from the board that they wanted that to happen’’ (16 August,
2010). This deal also meant that the ICC had to deliver one well-resourced event each year. Given the recently signed News
Corporation deal, Speed’s inclination for building sustainable business models, and the cultural heritage of the ICC board,
both in volunteer and ethnic terms, it was inevitable that the two worlds of sport would collide. The structure of the ICC did
not help.
4.2. Structural encounters
Structural encounters describe the reliance on delegate representation and a federal form of governance and how
behaviour is shaped accordingly. It also illustrates the various ways in which Speed sought to ‘manage’ or change governance
models. Speed’s experiences and insights about the ICC provide a rich example of behaviour in this form of governance. The
ICC structure is largely representative of the Test-playing countries, with some representation from the associate members,
of which there are 30. There are 13 directors, 10 of whom come from the full member countries, with a further three elected
by the 30 associate countries. In addition to the 13 directors, a President and Deputy President are elected by a Council which
consists of all member countries, but they do not have voting rights. The Deputy President is elected two years in advance,
although during Speed’s tenure the Deputy President was appointed one year in advance of assuming ofﬁce as President. The
CEO does not have voting rights, and as Speed noted:There would be 13 Directors sitting around the table with a vote, three of us sitting around the table that had the same
duties and obligations as directors but didn’t have a vote. There was another strange requirement that for a resolution
to pass at a board meeting, seven of the full members had to vote in favour of it, so any four could block any resolution.
So there was an immediate ﬁlter, a barrier to straight forward decision-making and it needed a large majority for
relatively simple matters to be approved by the board. (16 August, 2010)How the directors were appointed in each of their respective countries varied, with Speed reﬂecting on another unusual
feature of the ICC’s governance structure:Perhaps one other feature of that board that is unusual is that each of those ten directors from the Test-playing
countries was usually the chairman of the cricket board in that country. So in some countries they would go through a
process where they would come up through a club to a state, to the national body and then the international body,
while others would be new to cricket, appointed by the government. So Pakistan, Sri Lanka, from time to time
Bangladesh, they were appointed by the government, so you could ﬁnd someone coming to one of those meetings who
had no background in cricket whatsoever. In other cases they would be dyed in the wool cricket administrators who’d
been there for forty years and this was the high point of their career, to have graduated from the national body to the
international body as chairman of their country. So there was diversity. (16 August, 2010)The experience of board members also was variable, as Speed noted:I think it changed from time to time. When I ﬁrst started there were a number of quite experienced directors who had
been board members in commercial life, a couple of high-powered lawyers, chief executive of a major international
multi-national company. They certainly knew how to handle themselves in a board meeting. As time passed, they
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don’t think there was ever a sort of overriding characteristic of it. (16 August, 2010)The ICC structure is largely a reﬂection of governance models used in some member countries and this was the case with
the ACB. As previously noted, the ACB’s board was organised according to the delegate model and representation from the
states. Consistent with Speed’s inclination for developing sustainable business models, he set up opportunities for ACB
directors to review the governance model which is described below, as well as providing some perspectives on how the
delegate system worked:Some of them were better at it than others. The default position usually was that, in times of difﬁculty, go back and
represent the state. It’s the classic dilemma of the delegate system when you are appointed by the state. In many cases
the state will give you direction as to how you are to vote on a key issue, irrespective of the debate, and the fact that you
might have been convinced otherwise by listening to the debate. Over time we actually challenged that system. We
brought in a governance consultant, who one way or another has worked with most of the sports in Australia and New
Zealand. We had a very good one-day seminar where there was a great deal of support for a new model that would see
a hybrid system of some state directors and some independent directors until it went to the vote. When it went to the
vote it had no support whatsoever, which happens in a lot of sports so it’s very hard to get the status quo to change and
to get people to vote themselves out of ofﬁce. (11 May, 2010)By contrast, Speed was involved in successfully moving basketball from a delegate model to a hybrid board. In 1987
he was elected Chairman of the NBL, and in 1993 President of Basketball Australia. Although Basketball Australia was
confronted by many similar cultural and structural issues to cricket, the NBL itself was a separate entity, and was
governed by the team owners ostensibly outside the traditional Basketball Australia structure. When Speed assumed
the role of chair of both entities, he noted that some of the tensions between the organisations subsided somewhat,
although, as Speed stated, ‘‘in other ways the battles went on behind the scenes’’ (22 March, 2010). In the second half of
the 1980s, by which time Speed was Chair of the NBL, he observed, ‘‘we started to become aware of things like
governance and strategy and probity and conﬂict of interest’’ (22 March, 2010). Some of this was driven by the success
of the NBL and the mounting commercial opportunities through television rights and sponsorship, which saw the NBL
change from a model where the clubs supported the central administration to one where the central administration
paid money back to the clubs.
The need to capitalise on commercial opportunity, coupled with team owners’ approaches to governance, led the NBL to
introduce a hybrid model of governance. Largely, this was the result of the additional pressures confronted by NBL team
owners in terms of their own money being on the line and the need for some objectivity. On reﬂecting on NBL governance,
Speed (2011) observed:Chairing the NBL Board was a great experience. At the age of 38, I was running meetings of the owners of the teams –
up to 17 of them at the high point of expansion. The owners were aggressive, parochial and opinionated, despite
several of them being new to the game. Several were ﬁnancially stretched or going broke, and many of them did not
like each other – or me, for that matter. Despite that, they were very successful in taking the game to a point where the
NBL was regarded as one of the best professional basketball leagues in the world. I enjoyed the parry and thrust of
running difﬁcult meetings at a time when the sport was booming. I learnt the importance of preparation, patience and
when to attack and defend. (pp. 49–50)Just prior to Speed concluding his term as chairman of the NBL, a hybrid structure was introduced, which sought to add
some independent board members to the existing group of team owners or their representatives. Interestingly, the private
team owner model created more scope for adversarial encounters – encounters that Speed had prepared himself for through
his largely unstructured basketball experiences with the VABA and the Australian Basketball Federation in the 1970s, 1980s
and 1990s.
4.3. Adversarial encounters
Adversarial encounters largely capture the inherent tensions of a system confronting increasing commercial pressures.
They also signify the inherent tensions in the collision of the former amateur-oriented approach to sport administration and
the move to professionalise sport, characterised by commercial forces. These tensions were typically manifest through
decisions relating to ﬁnancial allocations, policy development, key personnel appointments and control via leadership.
Speed’s insights during this transition capture the parry and thrust of the times, hence the theme adversarial encounters.
Speed’s background as a lawyer had obviously helped prepare him for the ‘parry and thrust’ of legal argument. This clearly
assisted him with his role in shaping basketball’s largely unstructured context, inﬂuencing cricket’s traditional domestic
delegate context, and managing diverse cultures in addition to historical governance structures, all so much a part of the ICC.
One common element ranged across all three environments – commercial inﬂuences on sport began to gather pace in the
1980s, and the pace increased rapidly in the second half of the 1990s through until Speed’s departure from the ICC in 2008.
These commercial pressures created the scope for the two worlds of sport (i.e., amateur and professional) to collide, largely
because governance structures, cultures and personnel were not originally designed to accommodate sport in the
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adversarial encounters throughout the Speed transcripts and in his book Sticky Wicket (2011).
Whether these encounters were a product of the tensions embedded in the collision between volunteerism, traditional
structures and commerce, or the approach adopted by Speed, is an interesting narrative to emerge from the transcripts.
Equally, there was a sense of preparation throughout the interviews, in which Speed was preparing and steeling himself for
the robust cut and thrust of sport politics. The following extract is a good example:I can remember having some vigorous arguments over funding with the treasurer. I can remember having a vigorous
argument over funding where the Australian Basketball Federation was seeking to put up money and the states were
going to have to pay to fund it. Victoria was opposed to it. We argued about it all morning. It looked as though we’d lost.
It went to the vote and two states abstained and our position prevailed. The treasurer was furious. He was yelling at me
and I was yelling at him and we had to adjourn the meeting. There were a few incidents like that. That was, looking
back on it, all good experience for what was to come. (22 March, 2010)As already indicated, what was to come were leadership positions in basketball and cricket. A confrontational approach
was also evident in securing his ﬁrst leadership roles in basketball. He noted:It wasn’t a coup, it was more about time for a change. There was general recognition of that. As a brash 31-year-old, I
actually pushed my way into the position as president, there was a process, but there hadn’t been an election for many
years and my predecessor would have been president for 18 years, and I don’t think he’d ever been opposed, so I
announced I was going to oppose him and he’d had enough. We had a conversation about it. He suggested I wait a
couple of years. Looking back on it that might have been a good thing if I’d done that, but I said I wasn’t prepared to
wait a couple of years. I was prepared to take it to an election and test it. I hope I did it politely but I’d formed the view
that there were people there that were supporting me or pushing me to do that, and the time had come for change
within the organisation. (22 March, 2010)The adversarial nature of the federal system was imbued in Speed from his early days in basketball governance:In those early years I was aggressively standing for election and seeking election in a very federal system, where
everything was state-based and you were there to represent your state. There was no sense of going to Basketball
Australia meetings or ABF meetings and representing Australia, you were there to ﬁght for your state. (22 March, 2010)In 1985, Speed stood for the role of President of the Australian Basketball Federation and lost. He described it as a ‘good
learning experience’ in which he and the other main candidate alienated everyone, and the third candidate was elected. In
1986 he unsuccessfully stood for election as the Chairman of the NBL, but one year later was elected Chairman by the barest
of margins. As Speed stated, ‘‘I then had ten years as Chairman of the NBL but it was a very tenuous start’’ (22 March, 2010).
Further evidence of Speed’s propensity to accept a challenge was apparent in the way he articulated his reasons for accepting
the CEO position with the ICC. He stated:I certainly wasn’t ﬁnished at the ACB, I thought there was more to do there but the challenge of being chief executive of
an international governing body was a great challenge. The ICC was everyone’s punching bag. It was under-resourced,
poorly-regarded and it was the ultimate challenge. (16 August, 2010)In effect, the ICC structure was also a delegate model. As noted by Speed, some of the ICC directors wore ‘their country hat
at all times’. This structure created a ‘them and us’ approach producing the perfect formula for an adversarial approach to
governance. This is a distant view of the notion of an umbrella body created to encompass the interests of cricket globally.
Good governance was obviously a poor second cousin to a country’s need to control the ICC. Countries aggressively argued
their own agenda, often viewing the international body as the opposition, if not certainly a punching bag. As it is illustrated in
this extract, each country was intent on ‘pulling the ICC into line’.There was never a ‘we are your branch ofﬁce in this country’ mentality, they were very independent and valued their
independence. I don’t expect that [breakdown of independence] will ever happen. It doesn’t happen in many sporting
organisations anywhere where you break down that sort of ‘them and us’ mentality. We certainly didn’t do it. One of
the unusual features of an international sporting body is that everyone plays to their own media. So we’d often ﬁnd
the president of a country announcing before he came to the meeting how and why he was going to vote on a
particular issue and that he was going to pull the ICC into line on this particular issue where we’d been penalising his
country. Or, you’d often see that play out in the media announcing the decision before we’d had the debate. (16
August, 2010)The parry and thrust of the delegate system is also illustrated in the following extract at a domestic level through the ACB.
The complexities of race, ethnicity and cultural differences were minimal compared to those in the ICC, but a parochial
approach and the need to ‘ﬁght the enemy’ was just as obvious, with Speed observing that, ‘‘It was good every now and then
for the directors to be able to go back and report that we’d actually had a victory over New South Wales or South Australia or
whoever the enemy of the moment was. It was very parochial’’ (11 May, 2010).
Although the delegate system pervaded all organisations in basketball and cricket, interview data from his time at the
ACB did not convey the same adversarial themes gleaned from the basketball and ICC interviews. As demonstrated in these
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approach appeared more assuaging. The ACB appointment was his ﬁrst as a CEO, and this may have inﬂuenced his approach,
which appeared more oriented to working with the current system than ﬁghting it. When speaking about the delegate
system, Speed stated that:I had a preconception that it was ingrained, it was part of cricket and it wasn’t going to change. Where there was room
for change, I thought, and chairman Rogers had the same view, was that maybe we could get the state directors to, or
the ACB directors, to think more with a national hat rather than a state hat. From time to time they did. (11 May, 2010)There was evidence presented in the previous section demonstrating that he worked with the directors to consider
changing the governance arrangements, but, ‘‘When it went to the vote it had no support whatsoever’’.
The formulation of cricket’s ﬁrst strategic plan was one mechanism used by Speed in an effort to align cricket
strategies across the country. He needed the support of ACB directors, but, given the federal governance model, the
support of state associations and directors was equally important. Speed described a process that included visiting each
state and running workshops and meetings with the boards of each association. Stakeholder input was wide and clearly
designed to encourage an inclusive environment. As he noted, ‘‘We worked out we needed to be very inclusive if it were
to have any traction. We were trying to convince the states that they should then tie their strategic plans in under this’’
(11 May, 2010).
Despite a measured approach, the ACB was not short on issues when Speed arrived as CEO. A major industrial relations
dispute with players over player payments was in full ﬂight, followed by other player scandals requiring his full attention. In
Sticky Wicket, Speed (2011) stated, ‘‘My ﬁrst season as CEO of the ACB, in 1997, was all about industrial relations. It was
punctuated by anger, intrigue, threats, frustration, and several fractured friendships’’ (p. 64). This dispute was to run for a full
12 months during which time Speed and two directors were charged with the responsibility of managing the dispute, and
keeping the Board informed. In reﬂecting on the eventual outcome, Speed (2011) said:The dispute was painful and distracting for both parties but, remarkably, considering the rancour with which it was
conducted, both could look back on the outcomes with satisfaction and without bitterness. Perhaps it was a process
that had to be undergone in order to take the Board-player relationship into the modern era. (p. 79)Adversarial encounters, in this instance, were divided along team lines: the ACB Board and senior staff versus the players.
There was little time, initially at least, to be overly concerned with the imperfections of a governance system, or the desire to
ﬁght unnecessary battles. Signiﬁcantly, reﬂecting on the need for the dispute to move the relationship into the modern era
places the role of commercial pressures and the associated tensions into sharp focus.
5. Discussion
Slack (1985), one of the ﬁrst authors to examine the bureaucratisation of voluntary sporting organisations, stated that:In most western industrialized societies amateur sport at the local, regional and national levels is organized and
delivered by a vast network of voluntary organizations. At the highest levels, examples of this type of organization
characteristic are to be found in many national associations that govern the activities of a particular sport. (p. 145)In his work examining the Alberta section of the Canadian Amateur Swimming Association, Slack demonstrated how a
voluntary sport organisation was beginning to evolve to adopt what Weber (1947) described as a legal-rational bureaucracy.
As Slack observed:Manifestations of this tendency are clearly found in such areas as the increased number of certiﬁcation programs and
qualiﬁcation requirements for those staff who hold ofﬁce in voluntary organizations, the tendency to appoint paid
professional staff ‘to run’ the affairs of these groups, and an increasing standardization and formalization of the
systems that constitute this type of organization. (p. 146)This work became the forerunner to a volume of research by Slack and many other scholars examining the changing
structure and culture of sport. Typically, this work focussed on the impact of the transition from volunteer delivered sport
systems to more professional systems in response to commercial pressures and increasing accountabilities.
Slack’s 1985 analysis, described above, coincides with the administrative entry to the sport system of Malcolm Speed
whose lived experiences of sport in Australia and overseas describes two worlds colliding, or, more speciﬁcally, two
culturally different sports worlds colliding during his 30-year involvement in sport governance and management. Three
themes which formed the focus of this paper were identiﬁed from the interview transcripts, with two of the themes
consistent with Slack’s work in 1985. These themes, volunteer and cultural encounters, and structural encounters, together
with a third theme unique to this study labelled as adversarial encounters, summarise the main ﬁndings to emerge from this
study. From those ﬁndings a series of research directions (expressed as questions) have been identiﬁed relevant to guiding
future sport governance research. These research directions are shown in Fig. 1 which summarises the outcomes of the
ensuing discussion. Moreover, Fig. 1 illustrates the ﬂow of research in this study including the type of governance model
investigated, the three emergent themes forming the focus of this paper, key ﬁndings, and future research directions. The
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paper.
The key focus of this study – the description and analysis of changing sport structures and governance – ﬁts well with
previous accounts of the bureaucratisation of sport, but less well with how governance structures, such as a federal model
based on a delegate system, impede the functions of governance. Despite ample anecdotal debate regarding this model’s
weaknesses (Hoye, Smith, Westerbeek, Stewart, & Nicholson, 2006; SCORS, 1997), there has been a dearth of empirically
based evidence to support these claims. One of the dominant narratives embedded in the interviews, and highlighted in
Fig. 1, was the adversarial approach to governance. It is not clear whether this is an unavoidable and unfortunate outcome of
the delegate system of governance, or whether Speed himself was predisposed to this approach. Based on the insights
provided by Speed, the ﬁrst two questions to emerge in relation to future research directions relate to adversarial and
collaborative governance and are articulated as follows:1. To what extent does a federated model based on delegate representation create an adversarial versus collaborative
approach to governance?2. What are the factors that contribute to an adversarial or collaborative governance approach?
Previous research has focussed on the role of volunteer board members and the bureaucratisation of organisations (e.g.,
Auld & Godbey, 1998; Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999; Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Ferkins et al., 2009; Kikulis, 2000; Yeh & Taylor,
2008), but none to date has speciﬁcally focussed on the dynamics associated with adversarial and collaborative approaches
to sport governance. Structure is also a unique attribute of this research question.
In relation to structure, Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2000) contend that governance ‘‘generally refers to the means for
achieving direction, control, and coordination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals or organisations on behalf of
interests to which they jointly contribute’’ (p. 255). This deﬁnition captures the structural challenges confronted by the
VABA, Basketball Australia, the NBL, ACB and the ICC. They were all characterised by the need to ‘control’ wholly or
partially autonomous organisations, which tends to be manifested through strong individuals and personalities who seek
to resist any form of control by the governing body. This was evident through Speed’s descriptions of his early involvement in the
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the ICC.
Ironically, while the push for control was exerted from below, increasing commercial pressures evident in basketball and
cricket dictated the need for greater, rather than less control, by the governing body. This was necessary to ensure efﬁcient
and reliable decision-making when working with commercial partners. For example, News Corporation’s $US550 million
investment through broadcast rights required the ICC to deliver one event each year. This required the co-operation of most
of the major cricket playing countries, without undue political turbulence. However, the presence of multiple stakeholders,
organisations, cultures and agendas almost guarantees some level of political turbulence. Consequently, structure and
control emerged as important variables, or key outcomes, as shown in Fig. 1, with both obviously related to political and
network governance.
This political turbulence, or the desire to avoid turbulence, is referred to as political governance by Henry and Lee (2004).
The authors stated that political governance refers to the ‘‘processes by which governments or governing bodies seek to steer
the sports system to achieve desired outcomes by moral pressure, use of ﬁnancial resources or other incentives, or by
licensing, regulations and control to inﬂuence other parties to act in ways consistent with desired outcomes’’ (pp. 26–27).
This raises the second area of inquiry to emerge from this paper and is shown in Fig. 1 as questions three and four.3. To what extent is political governance used as a means to ‘control’ autonomous organisations to make them comply with
broader strategic directions for a sport?4. What political governance ‘techniques’ are used to control members of a network of sporting organisations and is it
possible to measure the effectiveness of these techniques?
An important implication in the framing of these questions is the recognition of a group of autonomous same-sport
organisations (e.g., country members of the ICC) as a network. Henry and Lee (2004) describe the network approach as
systemic governance, which has been used to help explain the complexities of multiple stakeholders and their role in the
governance of sport.
When examining governance systems within high performance commercial sport, Henry and Lee (2004) argued that, ‘‘the
top-down system has given way to a complex web of inter-relationships between stakeholders in which different groups
exert power in different ways and in different contexts by drawing on alliances with other stakeholders’’ (p. 28). In this form
of network, governance can be viewed as ‘‘the pattern or structure that emerges . . . as a ‘common’ result or outcome of the
interacting intervention efforts of all involved actors’’ (Kooiman, 1993, p. 258). As it is clear in all the organisations in which
Speed was involved, the patterns and structures that emerged were convoluted, with complexity increasing at each level up
in the system. In other words, the group of actors was smaller and more localised in the VABA, but through Basketball
Australia and the NBL the number of actors increased, as did the web of locations. This was also the case at the ACB, which
was less complicated again than the network of actors and structures involved with the ICC.
The implications of these complex networks of governance are summarised by Henry and Lee (2004) when reviewing
systemic governance structures:First, it is clear that in such a context, a signiﬁcant policy change can only be achieved by negotiation and/or trade-off
between various parties in the network. Second, governing bodies of sport in such contexts no longer govern, or wholly
control, their sport, or at least if they do, they do so by virtue of their ability to negotiate outcomes rather than dictating
those outcomes to passive recipients of their message. Third, this has implications not only for the organisations but
also for the skills required of the people who work within them. The skills are much more those of negotiation and
mutual adjustment than of rational, ordered planning and control. (p. 29)The irony in the need for negotiated trade-offs and mutual adjustments, as described by Henry and Lee, is that there was
some evidence presented in this paper of punctuated outbursts of robust debate characterised by yelling, anger, furious
argument, frustration, parochial attitudes and aggravation. Speed himself enjoyed the parry and thrust of this environment,
which was ingrained from his early experiences in the VABA. Equally, he was intent on adopting rational, ordered planning to
exert control, which in the case of the ACB appeared very effective. As it was noted previously, this was almost certainly
achieved due to a collaborative, inclusive approach, yet in an ordered fashion. There was also evidence of success in the early
days of the VABA where Speed relished the opportunity to craft a vision for basketball by leading a board and staff intent on
negotiating agreements with councils to build basketball stadia in Melbourne, which formed the basis of a solid business
model for the sport. This raises the third series of questions (questions ﬁve to seven in Fig. 1) to emerge from this paper:5. What techniques and approaches are used to forge a collaborative approach to governance?
6. Are there formal and informal approaches used, and what is the role of leadership, or the chair, in promoting a
collaborative approach to governance?
7. Is it possible for a federated model based on delegate representation to enact collaborative governance practices?
Solutions to these structural conﬂicts described in adversarial terms by Speed in his role as a leader or chair, were
typically found in hybrid forms of governance. In the hybrid model, some representation of the key stakeholders is retained,
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model introduced to basketball, and provided as an option for the ACB. Although the appointment of independent directors
conveys a sense of genuine independence, rarely is this the case as those appointed to the roles are typically connected to the
sport in some capacity. Such is the nature of sport. The hybrid model is designed to bring some objective strategic thinking to
the debate, as opposed to merely debating entrenched state or regional positions. Little research exists, however, detailing
the efﬁcacy of the hybrid model, which is shown as question eight and represents the fourth key area for investigation:8. How effective is the hybrid governance model, and how well does it relate to network theory in terms of collaborative
governance?
Notwithstanding the implementation of a hybrid model, or a genuine independent board for that matter, a network of
state associations or countries may still prevail, requiring deft skill to co-ordinate wholly or partially autonomous
organisations on behalf of interests to which they jointly contribute. Leadership and the skill-sets of the personnel involved,
therefore, are also important factors, as indicated in Fig. 1.
Henry and Lee (2004) highlight the importance of the skills required of those people who work within various governance
structures. As noted above, they suggest that negotiation and mutual adjustment are more important than rational and ordered
planning. This presents a conundrum as most of the generic management and sport management literature advocates rational
planning and control by senior management, and, indeed, the importance of the role of the board in setting the strategic
direction of the organisation (Brown & Chao, 2010; Ferkins et al., 2009; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). Although there is an apparent
contradiction here, negotiating outcomes in the context of a broad strategy is not inconsistent with recognising the skills
required in a collaborative governance approach. How an organisation implements the actions to achieve a desired strategy
may vary from state to state, or country to country, but may remain consistent with the broad strategic direction. This raises the
ﬁfth research direction to arise from this study, which is captured in questions nine to twelve:9. What skills, qualiﬁcations and background are required to work in sport governance?
10. Do these skill-sets vary according to the governance model used?
11. Is there a clear ‘personality’ type, or ‘style’ (as is implied by Henry & Lee, 2004) better suited to collaborative governance
and working in a network than an adversarial approach to governance?
12. Is the crystallisation of these skill-sets clouded by the ambiguity of governance models used in sport?It could be argued, for instance, that the federated delegate system of governance is, in theory, meant to be a collaborative
approach to governance. However, the largely unsophisticated approach by sporting organisations to governance has
created patterns of historically derived behaviours, or, in Kooiman’s (1993) terms, a pattern of behaviours and structures has
evolved impacting generations of actors.
Collaborative governance practice has emerged in this study as a useful theory against which to assess current sport
governance practice. Little has been written in the sport governance literature about collaborative governance theory, yet,
based on Lynn et al.’s (2000) deﬁnition of governance, it is clear that research directions in relation to sport governance have
not considered the implications of structure closely enough, and, speciﬁcally, the means to co-ordinate and control wholly or
partially autonomous organisations. Certainly, traditional top-down theories of governance common to the corporate world
do not necessarily work well in sport, as it was evident from Speed’s insights into the ICC.
Traditional governance theories have focussed on agency and stewardship as two contrasting approaches. Dalton et al.
(1998) describe agency theory as ‘‘a control-based theory in that managers, by virtue of their ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge and
managerial expertise, are believed to gain an advantage over ﬁrm owners who are largely removed from the operational
aspects of the ﬁrm’’ (p. 270). Stewardship theory, by contrast, is grounded in organisational co-operation, where
management wants to do a good job consistent with organisational goals. There is no underlying mistrust associated with
stewardship, which is not the case in relation to agency theory. Speed’s approach to his job as a CEO at the ACB demonstrated
the need to seek and build organisational co-operation, which was embedded in his desire to build rapport with directors and
state associations, and to work with, rather than against, prevailing governance structures and generally provide leadership.
This is consistent with stewardship theory.
Given the vagueness of organisational ownership in sport, agency theory does not ﬁt well in that context. Stewardship
theory is a better match but its application and capacity to explain organisational behaviour is also limited, as it has been
explicated in this analysis. This is reﬂected in Lynn et al.’s deﬁnition which recognises the autonomous entities that
potentially can fragment a sport. Network or systemic governance theory best characterises current sport governance
practice, as seen through the lived experiences described by Speed. These insights can add to our understanding of sport
governance theory and practice and also assist in shaping future research directions.
6. Conclusion
The insights from this study also draw into question the nature of ‘being-in-the-world’ as described by Heidegger (1927/
1995). Gadamer (1982) argued for the primacy of ‘‘play over the consciousness of the player’’ (p. 94). From this hermeneutic
D. Shilbury et al. / Sport Management Review 16 (2013) 349–363362perspective, governance itself can be viewed as a game, where each player is caught up in the play. The board is situated
within its own playing ﬁeld (sport), in a wider political (federated/nation states) and social context (leisure culture) of vested
interests (each board member has his own passion, interests and concerns). Any player, such as the participant of this study,
is caught up in the play. ‘‘Every game presents the man who plays it with a task’’ (Gadamer, 1982, p. 96), yet, in seeking to
achieve that task, one is always caught up in the play.
Speed describes the ‘play’ in his experiences of board governance in terms of: different personalities who come to the
table; how they bring a mix of personal, local, and state-dictated views; the tensions between the young board member and
the older board member steeped in the ways of the past, all backgrounded by the conversations that occur away from the
board table. When the board meeting arrives, all such dimensions come ‘into play’. Depending on the proﬁle of the sport and
the board, this play (and/or its outcomes) is under the watchful eye of the media who, prior to the meeting, also play a role in
shaping the direction of play. Once at the table, any agenda item has the potential to be caught up in the thrust and parry of
vigorous debate. The nature of governance is not to rubber stamp ready-made decisions but rather to allow the play of
opinions, values and interests to shape the way forward. A board member and leader with the knowledge and experience
such as Speed becomes a player more likely to be able to uphold the quest of good governance.
No theoretical model of governance will ever overcome the ‘play’ of the meeting itself as each member pushes, pulls,
argues, supports, questions and accepts. The challenge for sport governance scholars is to use theory to predict and explain
the ‘play’ of the meeting. In other words, scholars ‘play’ with the meanings and practitioners ‘play’ with the reality, and the
interaction between the two sharpens our collective focus on the phenomenon under investigation. As Harman (2007)
stated, ‘‘Human life is not something visible from the outside, but must be seen in the very act, performance, or execution of
its own reality, which always exceeds any of the properties that we can list about it’’ (p. 25). Thus, while theoretical models
are useful in guiding structure and process, ‘what happens’ is always something more, and often something different. Thus,
our interactions with Speed have helped identify ‘something more’ and the opportunity to theorise about sport governance
practice and its key players. Who the players are is a key determinant of quality governance. Governance systems to identify
new board members need to be established with due consideration for the ability of board members to add value and
inﬂuence to the ‘play’.
Fittingly, there are more questions than answers to emerge from this research. In employing a hermeneutic approach the
‘human experience’ has been honoured which has brought to light a number of issues and paradoxes. Described in this paper
as ‘two worlds colliding’, and revealed through three themes represented as voluntary and cultural encounters, structural
encounters, and adversarial encounters, there has been an attempt to synchronise the insights with ideas and theories from
the sport governance literature. In so doing, it is also acknowledged that, from a hermeneutic perspective, such thinking is
always ‘evolving’ and that, in themselves, theories and categorisations are not sufﬁcient (Smythe & Norton, 2007) to fully
understand the ‘play’ and ‘players’ involved with sport governance. The series of questions derived from this research are
thus offered as ‘evolving’ directions for future investigation of the sport governance phenomenon.
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